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SATELLITE SIGNAL SECURITY  
Copyright Protection  
Korean DBS Content and Transaction Security 
Don Flournoy, Professor of Telecommunications  
Ohio University, Athens OH, USA  
 
As a result of new developments in broadband communication, residential users, 
office workers and those who move from place to place have more ways to access 
the programming and services they want when they want them. 
 
It is clear that modern media and telecom users want increased 
choices in content and in services, and they want whatever 
options they choose to be available in a form that is fast, 
convenient and easy to use. 
Once users feel the satisfaction and power of having voice and video, audio and 
data packages at their fingertips, they tend to want more and more. Each new 
generation of consumers and producers expect greater and greater access to the 
content and services they like. 
And it is also clear that, if those options are available within the reach of those 
consumers and they cannot acquire them legally, a certain percentage of them will 
find ways to get them illegally. In the conversion of media services and 
telecommunications to digital distribution, intellectual property of all types - 
especially entertainment content - is vulnerable to computer hacking, piracy and 
unauthorized use. 
Current Realities 
To understand modern satellite consumer behavior, it is helpful to explore several 
basic assumptions about media and telecommunications. These assumptions can 
be framed in the form of hypotheses to be tested. 
Hypothesis No.1: The viewing public has more than one way to get electronic 
access to content. Among these options are broadband telephony (xDSL), cable 
(high-speed modems over fiber or coaxial copper), fixed wireless (MMDS and 
LMDS), mobile wireless (3G and Wi-Fi), satellite (DTH and IP-Sat), broadcast 
(digital radio and television), Internet (datacasting and streaming media on-
demand), utility (IP over power lines), and the local home video store (CDs and 
DVDs). 
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Hypothesis No.2: The viewing public will be influenced by price, by selection, by 
convenience, and by quality. If the service is too expensive home viewers will 
look for an alternative service that is cheaper. If a competing service has the 
programs the viewer prefers, the viewer will abandon one provider and seek the 
other. If access is too difficult or programs are scheduled at times that are 
inconvenient, the viewer will seek another vendor. If the programs offered by 
competing vendors are of higher quality, the viewer will prove disloyal. 
Hypothesis No.3: Media content will become more global; but media content will 
also become more personal. The viewing public of every country in the world will 
be better able to seek out the programs/experiences they prefer from the global 
media offered, but also from the local media. Local creation and local production 
will flourish everywhere. 
Hypothesis No.4: As media channels and broadband telecom lines become bi-
directional (2-way), users everywhere will be more in control of the content and 
the program schedule. Focus will be more on enabling users to create and share 
their own content and focus will be less on passive consumption. User control will 
force businesses to modify their technology investments and marketing plans. 
Hypothesis No.5: Over time, the viewing public will abandon fixed-schedule 
appointment viewing for video on-demand. The personal digital video recorder 
(DVR) will create a crisis for program schedulers, for audience measurement 
services and especially for advertisers since viewers will be able to record 
programs of their choice and view them at any time they like, or not at all. 
DBS Business Plans 
 
Funding for DBS programming can be advertising or 
subscription based, or based on government, corporate 
or public sponsorship. Interactive television (ITV) and 
electronic commerce (E/M/T-commerce) can also 
provide a third or fourth revenue stream. 
For DBS, advertising has been and will continue to be a dominant model for some 
time. But the future of this revenue source is threatened by technological 
innovations (channel surfing via remote control, DVR time shifting) and by 
increasingly fragmented audiences drawn to multiple competing services 
(Internet, cable, VOD over DSL and wireless). 
Since the end of the Cold War, government, corporate and public support for 
broadcasting services has been in decline. The majority of DBS operations are 
commercial not government services. Subscription is the only predictable revenue 
source over the long term for any entertainment-based broadcasting service, 
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including DBS. In concept, subscription satellite is a simple strategy for DTH 
operators. Providers use their space-based platforms to make a lot of different 
programs and services available to a wide region. The users pay for those 
programs and services that are of interest to them. 
In practice, managing a subscription-based DBS service presents some 
challenges. The viewing public must be financially able to pay and the satellite 
provider must be able to collect the money directly from the viewer based on 
programs and services consumed. In turn, the satellite provider must be equipped 
to deny programs and services to those users who have not paid. 
ITV services are also a mangement challenge for DTH providers in terms of 
security. Credit card and personal information must be protected. 
Program and Service Encryption 
To manage a successful subscription service, the DBS satellite signal must be 
scrambled. Only for those persons willing to pay the asking price will the signal 
be unscrambled. DBS providers can now decrypt a single event or a single 
transaction, or give a paying customer access to a bundle of programs and 
services for one day, one month, one year, or on-demand. 
The usual way to encrypt and decrypt the satellite signal is via an addressable 
decoder. The customer will purchase the receiving equipment (antenna and set-
top box) from a consumer electronics store. The home receiver will come 
installed with an access device, called a smart card. The customer will register 
with a designated satellite provider and contract for programming and services. 
The satellite provider, who activates the card from a distant location, can turn on 
or off any specific program or service. Impulse buying, as with home shopping, 
pay-per-view programming and access to the local weather report using two-way 
satellite (DVB-RC) direct or via a telephone or cable return line, requires an extra 
level of consumer management and signal security. 
Signal Theft 
In most societies, security of encrypted satellite signals is protected by law. Theft 
of an encrypted signal is an illegal activity. No matter how sophisticated are the 
technologies and passwords that make the satellite signals secure, however, 
hackers find equally sophisticated ways to illegally decode and acquire these 
signals. In some cases, the piracy of secure satellite signals is the act of a single 
clever individual by-passing DBS security for personal use; in the greater number 
of cases, signal hacking is a black market commercial activity sponsored by an 
organized piracy group. 
3
Flournoy: Satellite Signal Security
Published by OHIO Open Library, 2021
 
Most DBS subscription-based systems control access to 
their signals through smart cards installed in the satellite 
receivers. The smart card resembles a removable plastic 
credit card but is actually a microcomputer with its own 
embedded software and memory. Programmed with a 
unique identification number for that receiver, the card 
reads information provided in the satellite signal to turn 
on specific programs and turn others off. 
Computer hackers work hard to break each new security code developed by 
satellite operators, for there is a lot of money to be made selling reprogrammed 
cards (or selling reprogramming software and devices) that permit free access to 
movies, sports and pay per view events. 
 
Signal protection is important because piracy reduces the 
potential number of legitimate subscribers to DBS 
services, thereby diminishing the revenues that could 
otherwise be produced, sometimes totaling tens of 
millions of dollars. 
When users steal programming several things happen that are detrimental to the 
satellite enterprise. Content producers and program rights holders are deprived of 
the income needed to support a long production chain from content creation 
through final distribution. Loss of revenues limit the ability of providers to 
encourage the production of relevant and timely content and reduces the chance 
that end users will be able to access their favorite content at lower cost. A smaller 
revenue stream discourages investors in those technologies capable of giving end-
users lower prices and greater choice. So piracy keeps satellite subscription costs 
artificially high. 
Case Studies 
Canada: There are two DBS providers in Canada licensed to provide encrypted 
subscription services: Star Choice and ExpressVu. Because the mass of Canadian 
citizens are clustered in the South along the border with the United States, the 
temptation is strong for some Canadian viewers to want to also access the spill 
over signals originating with the U.S. DBS providers DirecTV and EchoStar. But 
Canadian law "prohibits the decoding in Canada of any encrypted subscription 
programming signal, regardless of the signal's origin, unless authorization is 
received from the person holding the necessary lawful rights under Canadian 
law."[1] 
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In 2003, some 750,000 Canadians were thought to be using illegal satellite 
systems to watch pay TV programs originating in the U.S. When the Supreme 
Court of Canada reconfirmed in 2002 that the decoding of encrypted signals was 
unlawful, Canadian law enforcement agencies began seizing illegal equipment 
and leveling fines against violators. 
The Canadians began an information campaign to justify to the public the reasons 
for the enforcement of the law. Canadian broadcasters estimated that the cost of 
black market satellite signal theft was costing them $450 million annually. 
Picking up the American signals meant that the competitiveness of Canadian 
broadcasting was undermined, making less funding available for Canadian 
producers, writers, artists, camerapersons, technicians and trades people. 
Canadian residents were warned that, if they were caught using the improper 
equipment, the service would be terminated and the equipment they had 
purchased would be rendered useless.[2] 
United States: Beginning in 1996, when its first generation encryption system was 
hacked, the U.S.'s largest DBS provider DirecTV has taken an aggressive stand 
against signal pirates. Today, the company takes legal steps to prosecute 
businesses dealing in piracy equipment as well as residential users who purchased 
the devices. 
Now owned by Rupert Murdoch's News Corp., DirecTV has about 12 million 
subscribers. It's approach to signal hacking has been to hire former FBI agents to 
uncover breeches of satellite security under the U.S.'s Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act. When violations have been found, equipment has been seized, 
mailing lists have been confiscated, web sites have been closed down and an 
electronic "cyber-strike" from space targeting illegal smart cards has been used to 
disable non-paying customers.[3] 
DirecTV's security system gives it the ability to reprogram its subscriber smart 
cards remotely. By the same path, it has been able to search for and destroy illegal 
cards. By mid-2003, DirecTV had filed 8,700 lawsuits to protect against 
infringement of its signal security.[4] 
EchoStar, the second largest U.S. DBS provider with some 9 million subscribers, 
does not talk publicly about its strategies to insure signal security. However, the 
company says it uses encryption technology that is periodically updated via 
satellite. These upgrades can only be received by paying customers. Like 
DirecTV, EchoStar employs people to monitor the Internet to look for evidence 
that its security codes have been broken.[5] 
The World Wide Web has been the principal means by which the hacking 
community shares information and sells its smart card reprogramming equipment. 
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Thailand: A lot of pressure is being put on pay TV operators by the big 
Hollywood-type studios to protect the copyright of films. One of the Motion 
Picture Association's strategies for coping with cultural and intellectual property 
theft is to get the issue of copy protection on the agenda of international trade 
organizations. 
Piracy of satellite signals - especially theft of pay TV programming - has 
flourished in Thailand. According to Cahners Business Information, some 300 
pirate cable operators and about one million pirate cable households are paying 
US$10 per month in subscriptions. Where pirate operations have been shut down 
by police, as many or more have opened for business since the demand for this 
product is high and money can be made when fees need not be paid to copyright 
holders.[6] 
The dominant pay TV provider in Thailand is United Broadcasting Corporation 
offering 48 channels, including 6 free-to-air services and 13 educational channels. 
In 2003, UBC's subscribers numbered about 420,000, close to the estimated 
financial break-even point of 450,000 subscribers. But UBC says its paying 
subscribers are not growing; rather the numbers are declining. This is due largely 
to signal theft and the discounted prices being offered by the illegal operators that 
rely on UBC delivered content. 
UBC has appealed to US programmers to help reduce pay TV piracy in Thailand 
by lobbying to get intellectual property protection on the agenda of trade talks 
between the US and Thailand. This strategy is thought to be a more visible and 
perhaps practical way to get the attention of the Thaksin Shinawatra government. 
France: Paris-based Thales is a large electronics company in the business of 
providing infrastructure and transaction security for IT and related services. Canal 
Plus Group has selected Thales" DTV Security Service platform, ThalesCrypt, to 
secure and protect its satellite feeds. ThalesCrypt offers a modular end-to-end 
solution that includes a scrambler, a receiver/descrambler and rights management 
software that Canal Plus will use in the distribution of its programming to 
authorized cable head-ends.[7] 
WorldSpace: Digital satellite broadcaster WorldSpace has developed a plan to 
increase revenues by expanding its audio and multimedia broadcast business to 
include electronic transactions and services. Many of the value-added services 
under consideration by Worldspace, such as e-commerce, e-health and e-
education, will be subscription-based and will require that signal security 
procedures be added to its current free-to-air broadcast services. 
WorldSpace has entered into a security contract with WISeKey, a technology and 
software vendor with the tools for protecting data exchanged among business 
partners and providing for digital identification. The WISeKey infrastructure 
supports interoperability within a global network of Registration Authorities in 
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more than 100 countries that will permit WorldSpace to address the 
communication needs of both private and public organizations within the large 
footprint of its regional satellites. WorldSpace satellites are particularly well 
positioned to provide services to Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Europe.[8] 
Lessons for Korean DBS 
The sole direct broadcast satellite provider in Korea is SkyLife, a commercial 
business sponsored and managed by the government-owned Korea Broadcasting 
System (KBS), the recently privatized national telephone and telecommunications 
service Korea Telecom (KT), the Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), and 
others in a consortium called the Korea Digital Satellite Broadcasting System 
(KDSB). 
SkyLife was launched in March 2002. Two years later, the DBS provider could 
boast in excess of one million subscribers. SkyLife is principally a Pay-TV 
subscription service but is also advertising supported. In 2003, it initiated Korea's 
first interactive TV service (offering home shopping, banking, games, weather 
reports and daily news on-demand) and in 2004 launched the country's first 
HDTV service. 
The exceptional growth of the DBS provider, indeed the very existence of the 
consortium of private companies and public agencies that serve as its shareholders 
and appoint its management team, is a direct outgrowth of Korea's new Broadcast 
Law of 2000. The Broadcast Law serves to not only provide for deregulation and 
privatization of media and telecommunication sectors, but also to seek accelerate 
development of Korea as a knowledge society. 
DBS springs from national policy in Korea giving priority to those activities that 
enhance economic development, support Korean culture , and provide for a more 
balanced development of national media, whether broadcast, cable or satellite. 
In Korea, protection of the satellite signal is thought of as a matter of national 
priority in Korea for the reasons that a successful DBS service will be a major 
contributor to: 1) insuring quality programming distributed nationwide; 2) 
stimulating locally originated content and content production; 3) adding value to 
products and services and increasing consumer choices; 4) building future-
oriented jobs and providing for job training; 5) positioning Korea more directly in 
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